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PUTTING GUANTANAMO IN THE REAR
VIEW MIRROR: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF DETENTION POLICY
PETER MARGULIES*
INTRODUCTION
Guantanamo is a little bit like Humpty Dumpty in reverse. It
was alarmingly easy for the Bush administration to put together and
has proven very difficult to take apart. At its core, however, closing
Guantanamo resembles other examples of facility siting, in which
the government determines where to put uses that trigger fear or
mistrust.1 Siting disputes turn on three factors: efficiency, equity,
and accuracy. President Obama’s initial announcement that he
planned to close Guantanamo within one year2 triggered congres
sional opposition. Congress took the announcement as a signal that
the President had not adequately considered the interaction of
these three elements.3 However, the President’s recent efforts fo
cus more closely on these factors.4 Because of this improved signal
ing, the President’s program will be productive, even though
meeting the one-year deadline has proven to be impossible.
This piece first defines efficiency, equity, and accuracy. Effi
ciency refers to the ease with which the government achieves a goal.
President Obama’s efforts to close Guantanamo reframed effi
ciency to entail not just catching suspected terrorists but also
regaining the goodwill that the United States had lost during the
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. I thank Brad Berenson, John
Parry, and Sudha Setty for comments on a previous draft.
1. See Peter Margulies, Building Communities of Virtue: Political Theory, Land
Use Policy, and the “Not in My Backyard” Syndrome, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 945, 951
57 (1992).
2. See Scott Shane, Obama Orders Secret Prisons and Detention Camps Closed,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A1.
3. See Anne E. Kornblut & Dafna Linzer, White House Regroups on Guanta
namo, WASH. POST. Sept. 25, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/24/AR2009092404893.html.
4. Id. The attempted Christmas Day bombing has heightened concern about the
accuracy of decisions to release detainees. See Charlie Savage, Nigerian Man Is In
dicted in Attempted Plane Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A14; David G. Savage,
Yemenis Might Stall Closure of Guantanamo, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at A10.
339
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preceding eight years.5 Equity speaks to burden-sharing. Both do
mestic political actors, such as legislators, and representatives of
other sovereign nations wish to ensure that no one site ends up with
a disproportionate number of detainees. However, the domestic
and international audiences clash in how they prioritize equity. Do
mestic audiences fear an overconcentration of detainees in any one
state as well as the outright release of detainees into any commu
nity. Foreign governments wish to avoid a disproportionate share
of detainees compared with other nations. Accuracy requires relia
ble determinations of a detainee’s past affiliations and future
dangerousness.
The challenge arises because these factors often conflict. Un
less policymakers are careful, efficiency will trump both accuracy
and equity. This result yields erroneous risk assessments and skews
distribution of burdens. The Bush administration used Guanta
namo as a site for suspected terrorists precisely because it valued
the site’s ease of use and discounted the two other factors. The
Supreme Court rebuked the Bush administration in a series of
landmark cases.6 President Obama rightly sought to remedy the
problem that the Bush administration had created. Ironically, how
ever, his initial efforts also failed to manage the conflict between
efficiency, equity, and accuracy.
Obama’s early announcement of a one-year deadline neglected
the importance of signaling. In dealing with external audiences,
such as Congress, signaling is vital to assure trust. Ambiguous sig
nals generate mistrust, despite the sender’s good intentions. Ironi
5. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, § 2(b), 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009)
[hereinafter Executive Order 13,492], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press
_office/closureofguantanamodetentionfacilities/.
6. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (striking down provi
sions of Military Commissions Act enacted at President Bush’s prompting that pre
cluded access to habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that Congress had not authorized President Bush’s unilateral
establishment of military commissions to try suspected terrorists); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that Congress had authorized detention of individuals ap
prehended on the battlefield, but that government must provide due process). For com
mentary on this line of cases, see David D. Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational
Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2008) (prais
ing Boumediene). Cf. Neal Kumar Katval, Hamdan v. Rumsfield: The Legal Academy
Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 92-103 (2006) (describing President Bush’s
order establishing military commissions as unprecedented assertion of presidential
power that undermined settled norms); Eric A. Posner, International Law and the War
on Terror: Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007-08
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 39-46 (2008) (criticizing Boumediene as unduly extending pro
tections of American law to noncitizens not on American soil).
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cally, Congress took Obama’s early closure deadline as a signal that
he shared Bush’s prioritizing of efficiency over accuracy.7 For Con
gress, this meant that Obama cared more about closing Guanta
namo on deadline and less about the probability of false
negatives—the release of truly dangerous individuals.8 Congress
also worried that Obama cared more about equity among nations
asked to resettle detainees and less about equity among states
where the administration would seek to transfer detainees who
could not be resettled internationally.
After several months of cross-talk with Congress, the adminis
tration adjusted its signaling.9 Beginning with Obama’s May 2009
speech at the National Archives,10 the administration indicated that
its first priority was achieving the right balance between efficiency,
accuracy, and equity. In another irony, Obama achieved that bal
ance by indicating that he was willing to accept, albeit with height
ened procedural safeguards, a number of the measures initiated by
the Bush administration, including military commissions and deten
tion under the law of war. Congress responded by signaling greater
willingness to work with the President to fashion a comprehensive
process for closing Guantanamo.11
To analyze the prospects for closing Guantanamo, this Article
includes five parts. Part I sets out the values of efficiency, equity,
and accuracy that should guide decisions about siting and disposi
tion. Part II discusses the importance of signaling and the problems
caused by initial ambiguous signals in a path-dependent policy pro
cess. Part III describes how early inattention to signals sent to Con
gress caused problems for the new administration’s Guantanamo
closure policy. Part IV discusses the recalibration in signaling rep
resented by President Obama’s May 2009 speech and the adminis
tration’s follow-up on the three values described in Part I. It
concludes that the administration has arrived at an approach in con
sultation with Congress that largely vindicates these values. How
ever, many improvements are still needed, such as access to habeas
corpus for detainees at non-Guantanamo sites like Bagram Air
Base in Afghanistan, limits on material support charges triable
7. See Kornblut & Linzer, supra note 3.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security
(May 21, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Remarks], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09.
11. See Kornblut & Linzer, supra note 3.
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before military commissions, and the use of hearsay evidence. Part
V discusses logistical and policy options for overcoming political re
sistance to the closure of Guantanamo and the transfer of detainees
to custodial facilities in the United States.
I. THREE CORE VALUES: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,

AND

ACCURACY

The political and ideological debates surrounding Guantanamo
can sometimes obscure the central values at stake. These core val
ues are efficiency, equity, and accuracy. I discuss each in turn.
A. Efficiency
Efficiency entails the simplest way to achieve a given goal. As
a general matter, approaches that take more time or create more
decision costs are not efficient. However, efficiency offers less reli
able guidance when goals conflict, or when one defines goals at dif
ferent levels of generality or over different time horizons.
As one neutral example, consider the question of transporta
tion. Given the question, “What is the most efficient way to get
from an individual’s suburban home to her suburban office today?,”
the answer might well be, “Drive my car.” However, if the question
were framed differently, as, “What is the most efficient way to re
duce consumption of carbon-based fuels?,” then the respondent
would consider whether it was practicable to bike to work or take a
bus. Reliance on notions of efficiency often privileges short-term
inquiries.12 However, that results from humans’ distorted discount
ing function,13 not any inherent attribute of efficiency.
Some developing countries may also ask, “What is the most
efficient way that we can grow our economies?” This question
might yield the answer, “Rely on currently cheap fossil fuels such as
coal as much as possible.” But, if one asked the question differ
ently, as, “How do we most efficiently ensure that our economic
growth is sustainable?,” then we might arrive at a different answer
that emphasized renewable energy sources.14
12. See Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 66, 69 (1972).
13. See Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law After Katrina: Reforming Envi
ronmental Law by Reforming Environmental Lawmaking, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1019, 1043
(2007) (discussing the “tendency of human nature to discount disproportionately the
consequences of human conduct that are distant rather than immediate”).
14. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523-24 (2007) (rejecting the agency’s
argument that greenhouse gas emissions from China and India will render moot any
United States efforts to reduce emissions); cf. Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as
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As another example of the disposition of persons, consider the
issue of community placements for people with mental disabilities.
Decades ago, state governments faced with opposition from civil
liberties advocates and budgetary concerns decided to move people
out of huge institutions.15 The most efficient means for moving
people out of psychiatric hospitals was placing former inpatients in
large “adult homes.” These facilities were technically located in
communities. As a practical matter, however, adult homes often
replicated the worst aspects of institutional living.16 In contrast,
policy makers who defined efficiency as the development of com
munity placements that offer people with mental disabilities the
chance to live independently would stress more human-scale resi
dential alternatives.
The operation of the Guantanamo detention facility under
President Bush also revealed internal tensions within the concept of
efficiency. A narrow vision of efficiency drove the Bush adminis
tration’s establishment of the facility. Bush officials focused on
Guantanamo’s appeal as a site outside the United States and be
lieved that geography would defeat accountability.17 The govern
ment would then be free to detain, interrogate, and punish
suspected terrorists with minimal interference. The Supreme Court
ultimately rejected this vision.18 Moreover, the Bush administraActors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary v. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
681 (2008) (discussing the role of subnational actors).
15. See Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Jurisprudence and Public Interest
Law, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 487, 514-15 (1999).
16. See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03-CV-3209(NGG), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 80975, at *5, 50 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009) (holding that New York’s policy
of referring former psychiatric inpatients to adult homes and reimbursing their care
violated Americans with Disabilities Act).
17. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to Wil
liam J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://www.
aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf. For criticism of the legal advice
supporting the selection of Guantanamo as a site for detention and interrogation of
suspected terrorists, see Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture
Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 455, 455 (2005); Stephen Gillers, Legal Eth
ics: A Debate, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 236, 237-38 (Karen J. Greenberg
ed., 2006); David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in LEGAL ETHICS AND
HUMAN DIGNITY 162, 176-80, 200-02 (2007); Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law:
National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68
MD. L. REV. 1, 35-40 (2008); Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of
Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579
(2009); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 80-85 (2005).
18. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534-36 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 485 (2004).
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tion also pursued a competing vision of efficiency that focused on
ad hoc deals to placate allies.19 In one such case, the Bush adminis
tration agreed to the release of a Kuwaiti detainee named Abdallah
Salih al-Ajmi who had earlier fought with the Taliban. Al-Ajmi
subsequently blew himself up in northern Iraq in a suicide bombing
that killed members of Iraq’s security forces.20 For a global power
like the United States, siting a detention facility for suspected ter
rorists inevitably exhibits efficiency’s disparate meanings.
B. Equity and Facility Siting
Efficiency also clashes with another fundamental value: equity.
Equity refers to communities, states, and countries receiving an
equal or equivalent share of both benefits and burdens.21 Allocat
ing burdens disproportionately to one entity is inequitable.
Equity issues often arise because the promotion of public
goods that aid all of society may also engender more localized
harm. If every community stresses localized harm over public
goods, the result is the familiar “Not in My Backyard” syndrome.22
However, the government’s failure to equitably allocate localized
harms raises concerns about equity. Land use and refugee resettle
ment policy constitute two examples.
In land use, siting certain kinds of facilities can promote impor
tant public policies but also impose disproportionate impacts on
particular communities. For example, suppose one believes that
wind farms can supply an efficient solution to the problem of sus
taining an economy in an era of increasingly scarce resources while
managing climate change. To achieve this public good, policymak
ers would consider efficiency issues at a more concrete level, asking
where government should site wind farms to maximize the benefit
from this sustainable technology. Here is where equity enters the
19.

See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., SETON HALL LAW CENTER FOR POLICY & RE
PROFILE OF RELEASED GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: THE GOVERNMENT’S
STORY THEN AND NOW 19-25 (2008), available at http://law.shu.edu/center_policy
research/reports/detainees_then_and_now_final.pdf; cf. Peter Margulies, The Detainees’
Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF.
L. REV. 347, 407 n.220 (2009) (arguing that the Bush administration’s reasons for de
clining to release detainees also included concerns about security situation in Yemen
and compliance with Convention Against Torture).
20. See Josh White, Ex-Guantanamo Detainee Joined Iraq Suicide Attack, WASH.
POST, May 8, 2008, at A18.
21. Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1028-30 (1993).
22. Id. at 1001.
SEARCH,
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equation. Efficiency, in this narrow sense, may be served by siting
as many wind farms as possible in communities that lack the politi
cal or economic clout to resist siting. However, while wind farms
are presumably a relatively benign technology—indeed, that is part
and parcel of their appeal—they do have localized impacts in terms
of noise and appearance. Considerations of equity would demand
sharing these burdens across communities, although this approach
would be less efficient if policymakers wished to build the maxi
mum number of turbines in the shortest possible time.
Allowing space for airing concerns about equity has become
important in addressing community opposition to siting decisions.
Consider, for example, the environmental-justice movement. Lowincome communities of color have rightly complained that certain
undesirable uses, including waste plants, have been disproportion
ately located near them.23 These communities receive the brunt of
harms associated with such projects, including pollution, noise, and
noxious aromas. Accommodating these legitimate concerns clashes
with the “efficient” construction of facilities.
Facilities serving people also promote public goods but often
impose localized harms. For example, residential treatment facili
ties for people with substance abuse problems clearly serve the pub
lic interest by enhancing alternatives to drug addiction and
incarceration. However, situating such facilities disproportionately
in low-income communities imposes risks on these communities, in
cluding the risks from facility residents who relapse in their rehabil
itation and break the law.24
In the human services context, such fears may often be exag
gerated. Many facilities are well run, minimizing adverse impacts
on their communities. Often attitudes hostile to such facilities stem
from animus, not from attention to the facts.25 Indeed, in address
23. See Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Move
ment, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 775 (1998); cf. Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative
Lawyering: Navigating the Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV.
1999, 2001-02 (2007) (discussing equity in siting of redevelopment projects that displace
low-income community residents).
24. Cf. Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the Barriers: Public Health Strategies for Ex
panding Drug Treatment in Communities, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 631, 677-78 (2005) (dis
cussing case law). But see id. at 726 (discussing sincere community concerns,
particularly concerns about facilities that fail to provide adequate services or permit
drug use by facility residents).
25. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)
(holding that enacting restrictive zoning regulations for a group home for people with
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ing complaints of discrimination from long-time providers of drug
addiction rehabilitation or similar services, courts have found that
localities raising concerns about overconcentration have violated
federal fair housing legislation.26
However, even in such cases, equity is important. First, gov
ernment’s commitment to equity sends the message that such facili
ties in fact serve the public good. When government endures the
tougher contest of siting facilities in communities better able to mo
bilize opposition, it demonstrates its sincere view that such facilities
serve pressing social needs.27 Second, equity helps defuse opposi
tion. As democracy shows again and again, when communities
have a voice, they are more likely to accept results as fair.28 When
states have used equitable formulas to allocate uses such as group
homes, they have often built a consensus that would be lacking in
the absence of such procedures. Having a voice also provides com
munities with a sense of control and counters fears that the govern
ment will act out of expedience, not principle.
Equity also emerges on the question of refugee resettlement.29
Scholars advocating for regional refugee resettlement have empha
sized that regional solutions share the burden of resettlement.30
They allocate refugee flow to a range of countries instead of conmental retardation based on unsubstantiated fears while allowing uses such as dormito
ries was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
26. See Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35,
50-51 (2d Cir. 2002).
27. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitu
tional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE
L.J. 2, 32 (2008) (arguing that requiring more extensive procedures from legislatures as
a “price” for enacting law assures courts that a legislature is committed to policy and
understands consequences).
28. See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 27-30 (1990) (assert
ing that belief in procedural fairness, including decision makers’ rejection of self-deal
ing, inspires compliance with legal norms); cf. Bernard P. Perlmutter, “Unchain the
Children”: Gault, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Shackling, 9 BARRY L. REV. 1, 54-59
(2007) (discussing how giving children more control in juvenile justice cases by rejecting
practice of shackling children in the courtroom promotes rehabilitation).
29. Questions of equity in refugee resettlement are not new. President Franklin
Roosevelt considered the issue in attempting to formulate a plan for the resettlement of
Jewish refugees from Germany. See Patricia Cohen, Roosevelt and the Jews: A Debate
Rekindled, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at C25 (discussing new book that outlines
Roosevelt’s consideration of a plan that would have resettled refugees in a number of
countries).
30. Susan M. Akram & Terry Rempel, Temporary Protection as an Instrument for
Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 12-13
(2004); see Tally Kritzman-Amir, Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility
Sharing in Refugee Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355 (2009) (discussing numerous reset
tlement mechanisms and the benefits that each provide).
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centrating refugees in one country where burdens become unman
ageable. Within host countries, equity is also important. In the
United States, for example, some efforts were made to resettle refu
gees in different states, to avoid undue concentrations of refugees.31
Where concentrations developed, the federal government offered
aid to defray state costs entailed in providing education and other
services.32 Federal outreach was not always as effective as it should
have been. Moreover, a few “gateway” states generally absorb
most of the immigrant population along with resulting costs.33
These states pay in more to the federal government than they re
ceive back in immigrant-related aid.34 However, this issue points to
a problem with ensuring equity, not a flaw in looking to equity as a
guiding principle.
C. Accuracy
In any question regarding siting facilities or the placement of
people, accuracy is a fundamental value. Policies carried out with
breathtaking efficiency amount to very little if they are based on
inaccurate information. Accuracy in any decision must minimize
two kinds of errors: false positives and false negatives.
False positives are errors where we think a person, practice, or
condition is harmful, but it actually is not.35 False negatives are er
rors that occur when we believe a person, practice, or condition is
harmless, but it actually poses dangers.36 As an example, consider
whether proximity to power lines causes a heightened risk of can
cer. If we believed power lines had this consequence, but they do
not, we would be committing a “Type I” error, which results in a
false positive. However, if we believed that proximity to power
lines had no ill effects, but it actually correlates with a heightened
31. See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(2)(C) (2006).
32. Id. § 1522(b)(2).
33. See generally Shirley Tang, Challenges of Policy and Practice in UnderResourced Asian American Communities: Analyzing Public Education, Health, and De
velopment Issues with Cambodian American Women, 15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 153 (2008)
(discussing the dispersion of varying Asian ethnic groups within Massachusetts).
34. Cf. Phuong Ly, State Urged to Invest More in English Classes, WASH. POST,
Oct. 27, 2005, at T16 (discussing federal spending cuts hindering Maryland’s effort to
provide adult education to burgeoning immigrant population).
35. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 578 (2000).
36. See id. (arguing that in the context of international trade law that a false posi
tive is a measure invalidated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) even though the
measure is actually not protectionist, while a false negative is a measure that the WTO
upholds, even though the measure unfairly favors economic interests in one nation).
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health risk, we would be committing a “Type II” error, resulting in a
false negative. Guarding against each error is important, since each
has opportunity costs. If we restrict the erection of power lines be
cause of erroneous health concerns, we forego the savings gener
ated by ready distribution of electricity. By the same token, if we
unduly discounted health risks linked with power lines, we would
be neglecting an opportunity to enhance the health and well-being
of persons subject to these risks and would end up paying more in
medical costs.
The law often imposes procedural safeguards to promote accu
racy. In the environmental setting, for example, the National Envi
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires an environmental impact
statement (EIS) prior to the start of a project.37 This requirement
gives a developer of a site an opportunity to consider whether a
project may harm the environment, and it gives community groups,
elected officials, and the media an opportunity to conduct a dia
logue regarding possible harms.38 The changes to a project accom
plished through the EIS process establish the virtues of such
procedures.
The criminal justice system historically cares more about false
positives than about false negatives.39 No justice system that is wor
thy of the name can discount the concern about false positives,
whether the adjudication concerned is criminal or civil, judicial or
administrative.40 Procedures that avoid false positives are also ar
guably central to international-law guarantees of due process.41
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
38. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 389 (2008) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989)); cf.
Jared Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. (forthcom
ing 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460924 (arguing that the majority in
Winter undermined NEPA by allowing the Navy to continue training exercises that al
legedly harmed marine mammals while it completed an EIS).
39. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-63 (1970) (stating that the rules of evi
dence are “historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men from
dubious and unjust convictions” (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174
(1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld,
Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009)
(discussing wrongful convictions produced by poor application of forensic science).
40. Cf. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that President Bush’s order
establishing military commissions failed to provide for rudimentary procedural
safeguards).
41. See David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military
Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 79-80 (2005) (discussing international procedural
norms in military commission context).
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Some argue that terrorism presents a different calculus. For
example, in the early response to September 11, constitutional
scholar Laurence Tribe argued that we needed to pay more atten
tion to the problem of false negatives.42 When wrongdoing involves
the risk of thousands of lives, as a terrorist attack can, applying
Winship’s approach to all detention cases gives the public interest
short shrift. In other contexts involving detention, we insist on far
less evidence. For example, the detention of prisoners of war re
quires no evidence of concrete conduct;43 it is sufficient to just wear
an enemy uniform.
The Bush administration took this approach to an extreme. It
cared very little about the problem of false positives. To determine
the status and dangerousness of Guantanamo detainees, the gov
ernment relied principally on Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs).44 The CSRTs do not allow legal representation.45 They
frequently failed to provide a detainee with the evidence against
him, notice of the most serious charges, or an opportunity to chal
lenge that evidence.46 They also typically do not allow a detainee to
present evidence beyond the detainee’s own testimony. In addi
tion, the government can convene more than one CSRT per de
tainee, to shop for the result it desires.47
The Bush administration never acknowledged that combat
against terrorist groups also makes avoidance of false positives
more urgent. Terrorists generally do not wear uniforms. This raises
the risk that we will mistakenly detain those who are in the wrong
place at the wrong time.48 While independent reports suggest that a
significant cohort of detainees remaining at Guantanamo are dan
gerous, these reports also acknowledge that the procedures estab
42. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Fury: Why Congress Must Curb Bush’s Mili
tary Courts, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 2001, at 18, 20.
43. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74-76 (D.D.C. 2009).
44. See MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING HEARINGS—
CSRT: THE MODERN HABEAS CORPUS? 7 (2006), available at http://law.shu.edu/
publications/guantanamoReports/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf. The govern
ment has used military commissions in only a handful of cases.
45. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008).
46. Id. The CSRTs also had no limits on the introduction of hearsay evidence,
making the ability to challenge adverse evidence “more theoretical than real.” Id.
47. See DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, supra note 44, at 37. Despite stacking the
deck, the Bush administration sometimes generated false negatives when it released
detainees to please American allies. See White, supra note 20.
48. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (discussing the risk of
sweeping up “errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker”).
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lished by the Bush administration led to an unacceptably high rate
of false positives.49
D. Summary
The Bush administration’s experience illustrates the inter
dependence of the values identified in this section. The Bush ad
ministration assembled Guantanamo in a search for the most
efficient way to eliminate false negatives. Ultimately, however, the
Bush system’s indifference to false positives undermined the legiti
macy of its counterterrorism program. The damage done to
America’s reputation made counterterrorism policy less efficient in
the long term than a policy that matched toughness with concern
for traditional safeguards. Moreover, the unilateralist temperament
that guided Guantanamo’s emergence as a site for suspected ter
rorists also alienated the courts, which proceeded to modify the sys
tem that Bush officials had created.50
II.

SIGNALING

AND

NORMS

As the Bush administration’s experience demonstrates, norms
like efficiency, equity, and accuracy do not play out in a vacuum.
Political and legal disputes inevitably introduce various audiences
and constituencies. The tensions between norms become even
more acute when one considers that different audiences prioritize
different norms. For example, the audience for United States for
eign policy includes domestic audiences like the Congress, the
courts, the press, and the public, along with advocacy groups on one
side of an issue or another. International audiences also figure in
the equation, including foreign governments, transnational tribu
nals, and electorates. Before indicating approval of an executive
policy, each audience looks for a signal that the President shares its
norms.
A. Signaling, Values, and Trust
Signaling is crucial because a central problem with public and
private life is a paucity of trust.51 People in public life encounter
suspicion from audiences who believe that the leader cannot be
49.

See BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE
AGE OF TERROR 74-79 (2008).
50. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT IN
SIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 205-08 (2007).
51. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-20 (2000).

IN THE
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trusted to observe a norm valued by that audience. The audience
will then be unwilling to cooperate with the leader. Individuals and
entities send signals to indicate that they are worthy of trust. For
example, a bank-seeking depositor will invest in a building to indi
cate to potential customers that it intends to be around for a long
time and thus will not sell out the customer for a quick pay-off.52
However, people run into difficulties when perceptual asymmetries
lead different audiences to interpret signals in different ways. As a
quick example, suppose that a young male professional decides that
a modest ear piercing will signal fashion sense.53 This signal works
well with other moderately fashion-conscious young professionals.
However, it may send the “wrong” signal to other groups. For ex
ample, older individuals may believe that even a modest piercing
signals a fundamental rejection of norms associated with civilized
society. Some older individuals clearly took this view of long hair
in the 1960s. On the other hand, it is possible that some groups that
do sincerely reject mainstream norms, such as gangs, may also view
our earnest but fashionable professional as an aspirant to member
ship in their group. They may seek to enlist the professional in ini
tiation rituals that conflict with mainstream values. The result may
be a threat to the professional standing of the actor (with older peo
ple) or a threat to his health (with gangs).
Politicians must be aware of the possibility of such perceptual
asymmetry, or “mixed or crossed signals” in the vernacular. When
such asymmetries occur, one audience will view the leader as un
trustworthy and will retaliate or hedge its bets. Leaders need to
understand the interpretations that different audiences will attri
bute to particular signals in addition to understanding their subjec
tive intent. Saying “I meant well” is an indication that such
perceptual asymmetry has muddied the leader’s message.
B. Flawed Signaling and Path Dependence
Faulty signaling has costs that are sometimes irreversible.
Some might argue that issues with initial signals matter little be
cause a President has the resources to recoup later, by righting her
message. Unfortunately, one cannot guarantee that garbled signals
will be costless in this way. This is true because of the phenomenon
of path dependence.
52.
53.

Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 29.
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Path dependence suggests that where we have been influences
where we are going. Taking a different path to a goal makes certain
options more or less palatable to different groups. Measures that
may be acceptable in one signaling environment become unaccept
able when the environment changes. If the President loses credibil
ity on an issue, he will have to spend valuable capital in returning to
the status quo ante. For example, if a crucial audience interprets a
presidential signal as a preference for efficiency over accuracy, it
will demand a more rigorous bonding mechanism to ensure that the
President values accuracy appropriately. For example, the courts
responded to the Bush administration’s overreaching on detention
by requiring procedural safeguards.54 Moreover, losing credibility
with a crucial audience gives adversaries an opening. Credibility
can be difficult to recoup. While a President consumes time and
effort in this task, the other side has the opportunity to promote its
own agenda.55 These consequences need not be fatal to the Presi
dent’s policy preferences. However, they do introduce complica
tions that more judicious signaling could have finessed.
With this framework in mind, we can consider the impact of
President Obama’s January 2009 announcement of a one-year
deadline for closing Guantanamo.
III. THE GUANTANAMO CLOSURE DEADLINE: CONSEQUENCES,
INTENDED AND UNINTENDED
The Obama administration has done many things right in its
efforts to close Guantanamo and paved the way for a process that
vindicates United States security needs and the demands of justice.
It has made a concerted effort to reverse the unilateralism and
high-handed policies of the Bush administration. However, it did a
number of those things in the wrong order, which needlessly com
plicated its task and spawned opportunity costs.

54. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding that detainees
had access to habeas corpus).
55. For more on path dependence, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS
OF REASON 108-110 (2009); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The
Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601,
606-22 (2001).
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A. The Obama Closure Announcement and the Reframing of
Efficiency
President Obama’s announcement that he would close Guanta
namo within a year redefined efficiency in counterterrorism. Bush
and Cheney viewed efficiency narrowly, as the speed entailed in
taking concrete steps to kill or incapacitate terrorists.56 President
Obama has a broader vision. While the President does not slight
the importance of killing or detaining those who would do violence
against the United States, he also views efficiency as entailing the
accumulation of good will throughout the world.57 The President
understands the importance of American soft power to our ability
to achieve policy goals.58 When America has credibility on the
world stage, it can count on cooperation from other governments
and populations. Moreover, American credibility blunts charges of
excess or hypocrisy that furnish recruiting tools for terrorists.
President Obama noted in his closure order that Guantanamo
had become a symbol of overreaching that undermined the United
States’s global reputation.59 Closing Guantanamo was one element
in a program to efficiently restore American credibility. Armed
with that credibility, America could win the battle for hearts and
minds. President Obama’s view of the strategic value of closing
Guantanamo was correct. However, his sequencing of events cre
ated doubts about both the accuracy and equity that impeded this
larger project.
B. The Costs of Faulty Sequencing
The Obama administration’s setting of a one-year deadline for
closing Guantanamo created a backlash on Capitol Hill that
56. As President Bush’s second term progressed, key figures like Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates (held over by incoming President Obama) and Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice came to believe that the closure of Guantanamo would promote
America’s foreign policy goals. While Secretary Gates drew down the Guantanamo
detainee census, the Bush administration could not mount a sustained effort to close the
facility. See Helen Cooper and William Glaberson, At White House, Renewed Debate
on Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2007, at A1.
57. See Executive Order 13,492, supra note 5, § 2(b), at 4897.
58. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE
WORLD’S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 35 (2002) (warning that global re
action to American tactics viewed as excessive will undermine cooperation); Christo
pher J. Borgen, Hearts and Minds and Laws: Legal Compliance and Diplomatic
Persuasion, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 774-78 (2009) (discussing the importance of global
credibility); cf. Harold Honju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1479, 1499-1501 (2003) (arguing against unilateral policies).
59. See Executive Order 13,492, supra note 5, § 2(b), (d), at 4897, 4898.

R

R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE203.txt

354

unknown

Seq: 16

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

24-MAY-10

13:38

[Vol. 32:339

stretched across party and ideology. Some dismissed this backlash
as a crude expression of the “Not-In-My-Backyard” (NIMBY) syn
drome.60 NIMBY surely played a role. However, legitimate con
cerns with accuracy and equity also drove opposition.
1. Signaling on Accuracy
First consider the issue of accuracy. The Obama administra
tion understood the problem of false positives that it had inherited
from the Bush administration.61 However, it did not initially take
adequate stock of the problem of false negatives. Officials who
pushed for the one-year deadline had not yet inspected the files of
Guantanamo detainees.62 These officials therefore lacked adequate
information on the dangerousness of individual detainees, or on dif
ficulties the administration would encounter in resettlement
efforts.63
An approach that reconciled the problems of false positives
and negatives would have started instead with a comprehensive re
view of detainee law and policy as well as an examination of indi
vidual detainee files. This review and analysis could have paved the
way for setting a realistic deadline for closing the facility. The ad
ministration instead first announced that it intended to close Guan
tanamo within a year, and only then began its review of the files.
60. See Sarah Mendelson, The Guantanamo Countdown, FOREIGN POL’Y, Oct. 1,
2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/01/the_guantanamo_
countdown?page=0,1&%24Version=0&%24Path=/&%24Domain=.Foreignpolicy.com,
%20%24Version%3D0 (asserting that “members of Congress were running for cover
like children in a rain storm”); Editorial, Hypocrisy on the Hill, WASH. POST, July 5,
2009, at A18.
61. See Executive Order 13,492, supra note 5, § 2(b), at 4897.
62. See Kornblut & Linzer, supra note 3; cf. KEN GUDE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GETTING BACK ON TRACK TO CLOSE GUANTANAMO 3 (2009), available at http:
//www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/11/pdf/closing_guantanamo.pdf (noting that
Obama officials found that detainee files were in disarray, which further slowed the
review process).
63. Resettlement difficulties flow from two sources. First, the Bush and Obama
administrations both agreed not to transfer detainees to countries where the detainees
would face a risk of torture. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, arts. 1-2, U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984); cf. Belbacha v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (noting Algerian detainee’s fear of torture); Del Quentin Wilber, Chinese Detain
ees’ Release Is Blocked, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2008, at A3 (noting Chinese detainees’
fear of torture). Second, both administrations worried about security arrangements for
released detainees in Yemen, the country of origin for approximately forty percent of
the detainees remaining as of October 2009. See Robert F. Worth, Wanted by F.B.I.,
but Walking out of a Yemen Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008, at A3 (noting convicted
terrorist’s exit from court hearing in Yemen).
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This sequencing made the one-year deadline seem arbitrary. An
nouncing the deadline also allowed opponents to argue that the ad
ministration had discounted the need for accuracy in release
decisions.64
Congress responded quickly. In resolutions and appropriations
measures, it sought to bar the expenditure of federal funds on clos
ing Guantanamo and resettling detainees within the United
States.65 It also required the executive to notify Congress when re
lease of a detainee was imminent.66
Congress’s restrictions on closing Guantanamo were a proxy
for concerns about accuracy. Substantial uncertainty surrounded
decisions about the dangerousness of remaining detainees. Con
gress understood that uncertainty includes both the probability and
gravity of harm. Any release process carries with it the prospect of
some false negatives. Moreover, a terrorist attack on the site used
for the trial or detention of a terrorist would have catastrophic con
sequences, as New York discovered during the first attack on the
World Trade Center in 1993 and the September 11 attacks. Since
the government could not guarantee determinations of dangerous
ness that are completely accurate, Congress sought to compensate
for that accuracy deficit by prohibiting the transfer of detainees to
the United States.67
This was not the first time that Congress has acted out of un
certainty about both the probability and gravity of false negatives.68

64. Both the President and Secretary of Defense Gates have argued that setting a
deadline signals to the bureaucracy that statements about change are not mere “cheap
talk.” That position makes intuitive sense. However, it is unclear that President
Obama’s closure deadline had such salutary consequences. Experts have noted that
bureaucrats lost interest in the difficult, tedious task of sorting through detainee files
because no one person in the White House mounted a sustained effort to complete the
task. See Mendelson, supra note 60. Moreover, the administration also failed to
promptly follow up on the Inauguration Day announcement’s potential for generating
cooperation in other countries. A special diplomatic envoy to promote detainee reset
tlement was not in place until months after the President’s announcement. Id.
65. See Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2346, Operation and Mainte
nance, Defense-Wide § 3, 111th Cong. (2009) (engrossed amendment as agreed to by
Senate, May 21, 2009) (making funds available only to relocate detainees outside the
United States), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
111_cong_bills&docid=f:h2346eas.txt.pdf.
66. See Editorial, supra note 60.
67. Id.
68. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists,
and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 694 (2009).
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Some measures have been struck down by courts69 or have survived
largely as negative examples.70 Others have met with somewhat
greater acceptance. For example, in Demore v. Kim, the Supreme
Court upheld Congress’s decision to require prehearing detention
of persons deportable because they have engaged in terrorism or
committed a criminal offense.71 The Court noted that many people
show up at hearings when individualized determinations including
bond are required.72 However, there are invariably some false
negatives—people who turn out to be flight risks despite the indi
vidualized assessments. The Court found that Congress could have
reasonably decided that it wanted to cut false negatives to zero.73
The Guantanamo restrictions have a similar underlying rationale.
This rationale echoes traditional approaches to tort law and
other areas. Courts have long balanced the probability and gravity
of harm.74 When a particular harm is sufficiently grave, precautions
increase even if probabilities are low. To consider a good analogy,
take the case of peanut allergies. A prudent individual with such an
allergy will avoid even a low probability of exposure because he
knows the stakes. Some public policy decisions embody a similar
logic.75
Congress’s efforts also signaled that it wanted greater consulta
tion with the President on decisions regarding detention of sus
pected terrorists.76 Some of that further input might take the form
of additional legislation, while in other cases informal consultation
might be sufficient. In any case, Congress indicated that it wished
to be kept apprised.

69. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2242 (2008) (striking down provi
sions of Military Commissions Act limiting habeas corpus).
70. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding statute
criminalizing failure to comply with executive order that Japanese-Americans evacuate
their homes on the West Coast).
71. 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
72. Id. at 520.
73. Id. at 528.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
75. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 494, 511-13 (2008) (noting flexibility in standing doctrine regarding
challenges to long-term environmental harms).
76. For an important discussion of the role of resolutions and other nonstatutory
measures in congressional signaling, see Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law:
Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 588-89 (2008).
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2. Signaling and Equity
In addition, congressional action stemmed from concerns
about the new administration’s perceived approach to equity. Con
gress believed that the administration’s Guantanamo policy re
flected more concern about international aspects of equity in
detainee transfers than about domestic ramifications. Viewed from
an international perspective, equity would counsel that the United
States agree to accept some detainees if it expects other countries
to volunteer to do the same. A domestic perspective on equity, in
contrast, focuses on burden-sharing among the several states. By
not responding to commentators who pushed the internationalequity point,77 the new administration stoked congressional appre
hension that it would disregard domestic-equity concerns.78 The
blizzard of bills and resolutions to limit Guantanamo closure re
flected this anxiety.79
The administration’s lack of response on this point also sig
naled an initial inattention to trade-offs between international eq
uity and the broader conception of efficiency that the
administration had hoped to promote. The international goodwill
the administration sought involved cooperation from other global
powers, including China.80 However, the Chinese opposed the ma
jor international-equity step championed by advocates.81 Advo
cates urged that the government permit the resettlement within the
United States of the Uighur detainees—ethnic Turks and Chinese
nationals who had been training to fight the Chinese government.82
This step would have also raised accuracy concerns: federal law and
policy has long sought to deter those planning violence against an
77. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 60 (arguing for international perspective on
equity and detainee transfers).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Chinese cooperation would be necessary, for example, for efforts to contain
Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
81. See Erik Eckholm, Freed from Guantanamo, Uighur Muslims Bask in Ber
muda, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2009, at A4.
82. For a cogent argument in favor of this position, see Barbara Olshansky, Why
Are We Trying to Solve the “Problem of Guantanamo?,” A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L.
REP., Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 5, available at http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/nslr/2008/nov
_dec_nslr_final.pdf. See also Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022, 1024
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding evidence that “indicated that at least some petitioners in
tended to fight the Chinese government, and that they had received firearms training
. . . for this purpose” (citing Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 2008))).
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other regime from using the United States as a hub.83 Admission of
the Uighurs into the United States would have given them access to
United States’s wealth and communications networks to continue
their fight against the Chinese regime. In contrast, settling the
Uighurs elsewhere would limit the detainees’ influence and ac
cess.84 The Chinese government was legitimately concerned about
this issue. However, the administration initially equivocated about
the Uighurs, which China could have viewed as a signal that the
administration had discounted Chinese concerns.85
IV.

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION FINDS ITS BEARINGS

After a start hindered by faulty sequencing, the new adminis
tration has made substantial progress in righting the course. Presi
dent Obama outlined the framework in his speech at the National
Archives in May 2009.86 The President’s approach placed accuracy
front and center and offered an approach that would minimize false
positives and negatives. Promoting accuracy will also serve the
broader definition of efficiency advanced by the new administration
by building international goodwill and leveraging America’s stillsubstantial reserves of “soft power.”
Broadly speaking, the President’s May address outlined a
three-part approach to the detention of suspected terrorists. First,
the President noted, criminal prosecution in civilian courts will be
83. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1029 n.14 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I)) (pro
viding for the exclusion from the United States of aliens who engage in terrorist activ
ity, including preparations for violence against another government). Those accuracy
concerns were present even though the Uighur detainees posed no direct threat to the
United States. Id.; cf. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 854 (finding that the government had failed to
prove that Parhat, an ethnic Uighur, was an “enemy combatant”). Declining to provide
safe harbor to those plotting violence against another regime promotes reciprocity in
counterterrorism policy by encouraging other countries to deny safe harbor to those
plotting violence against the United States. See also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d
59, 74 (2d Cir. 1984) (analyzing provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
that authorize surveillance upon finding by court that target of surveillance is an agent
for a foreign group seeking to “carry out raids against other nations”).
84. The government has agreed that the Uighurs cannot be sent back to China
because of the risk that they would be tortured. See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II),
561 F.3d 509, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discussing government policy, while declining to
order that the government provide advance notice to detainees of resettlement plans).
The United States should provide other Uighurs who are already in the United States
or duly apply for admission with an opportunity to demonstrate that they fall outside
the exclusion provision cited above and qualify for refugee status. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2006) (defining refugee status).
85. By June, the administration had righted the ship on this score, resettling a
number of Uighur detainees in Bermuda. See Eckholm, supra note 81.
86. See Obama Remarks, supra note 10.
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the preferred route where “feasible.”87 Second, the President
noted, military commissions are also an appropriate forum where
detainees are charged with violations of the law of war.88 Third, the
President asserted, in a small number of cases, trial in any venue
will not be an option, and the government will then detain individu
als under the laws of war while providing procedural safeguards and
periodic review.89
This framework is sound. However, a couple of caveats are
worth noting for further analysis. First, President Obama’s May
2009 framework balanced liberty and security precisely because it
focused on overall values, instead of tailoring values to closure of
Guantanamo by a date certain.90 Second, in some particulars the
President’s approach did not adequately deal with the problem of
false positives, both on questions of the reliability of evidence that
courts have addressed since and on the question of extending ac
countability to other detention sites, including the United States air
base at Bagram in Afghanistan. This part explores the President’s
framework and pays particular attention to lingering accuracy
issues.91
A. Balancing Error Rates in Criminal Prosecutions
The Obama administration’s decision to try both alleged 9/11
mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and alleged Christmas Day
87. Id. at 252; see also Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of
Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts (2008), available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (arguing that federal
courts can successfully conduct terrorism trials); Prosecuting Terrorists: Civilian and
Military Trials for Guantanamo and Beyond, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terror
ism and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (Lex
isNexis Congressional) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing] (remarks of Sen. Sheldon
Whitehouse, D-R.I.) (same).
88. See Obama Remarks, supra note 10. The Obama administration also worked
with Congress after the May address to refine rules on military commissions. See, e.g.,
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 87 (testimony of Jeh Johnson, General Counsel for
the Defense Department, and David Kris, Assistant Att’y Gen. for National Security).
In addition, the administration set up task forces on detention and other matters to
clarify its legal approach.
89. Obama Remarks, supra note 10.
90. Id. The President did not disavow that date, although the conventional wis
dom shifted toward the view that meeting the one-year deadline would be difficult, if
not impossible.
91. The next Part analyzes options under this framework for closing
Guantanamo.
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bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in federal court92 suggests
that the President views the criminal justice system as the first re
sort for the trial of suspected terrorists. The federal courts have a
reputation for independence that stems from the Constitution, the
Framers, and the early precedents of the Supreme Court.93 Moreo
ver, judges will best be able to balance the accountability supplied
by open proceedings and the need for security required in exigent
circumstances.
To avoid false positives, federal judges presiding over trials of
alleged terrorists must carefully analyze evidentiary issues. They
should exclude statements obtained through the use of coercive
techniques. Judges should also exclude evidence of marginal rele
vance that will tend to inflame the jury, such as the video of Osama
bin Laden offered by the government in a case against a Hamas
fundraiser.94
However, judges will also need to calibrate the rules of crimi
nal procedure to give the government the flexibility that transna
tional terrorism cases require. For example, the exigencies of
apprehending suspects abroad often preclude the immediate provi
sion of a lawyer. Government agents should be able to tailor Mi
randa warnings to the resources available in a foreign country with
a different legal system.95 Similarly, the warrant clause of the
Fourth Amendment should not apply to searches abroad.96 In
stead, courts should evaluate such searches under standards of rea
sonableness that consider the prevailing environment in the nation
92. See Eric Lichtblau & Benjamin Weiser, For Both Sides, Unparalleled Legal
Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A13 (discussing decision regarding Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed); Savage, Nigerian Indicted in Terrorist Plot, supra note 4 (discussing charges filed against Abdulmutallab).
93. See Gerald E. Rosen & Kyle W. Harding, Reflections upon Judicial Indepen
dence as We Approach the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison: Safeguarding the Con
stitution’s “Crown Jewel,” 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 791-92 (discussing the role of the
Framers in drafting the Constitution to provide for an independent judiciary and the
role of the Supreme Court in defining its role as an independent coequal branch of the
government).
94. See United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 161-63 (2d Cir. 2008).
95. See United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E.
Afr. (Fifth Amendment Challenges)), 552 F.3d 177, 206-09 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding
modified Miranda warning in case of defendant convicted of role in 1998 bombings of
United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania).
96. See United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in
E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment Challenges)), 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding
“that the Fourth Amendment does not govern searches conducted abroad by U.S.
agents”).
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where the search occurred.97 In addition, judges may need to ac
commodate security concerns by allowing ex parte presentations on
the sources and methods that produced information justifying a
search.98 These changes vindicate the public interest in pursuing
and deterring terrorists while preserving the accountability that dis
tinguishes American law.99
B. Military Commissions
As President Obama indicated in his May 2009 remarks, mili
tary commissions are an appropriate and lawful way to try sus
pected terrorists.100 The Framers were aware of the need for
military commissions, since they were familiar with General Wash
ington’s use of a military commission to try the British spy Major
John Andre during the Revolutionary War.101 The government also
used military commissions during the Civil War102 and World War
II.103 Military commissions provide an additional layer of protec
tion for sensitive information as well as greater flexibility in the in
97. See id. (holding “that searches of U.S. citizens [abroad] need only satisfy the
Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness”).
98. Id. at 165-67.
99. See generally Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008)
(arguing that criminal adjudication of terrorism cases is becoming more flexible, while
other forums such as military commissions are providing more procedural safeguards to
defendants, leading to common ground); Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 87 (arguing
that federal courts fashioning flexible rules should be first resort for prosecution of
terrorism cases). Some have argued that to ensure flexibility Congress should establish
a National Security Court. See GLENN SULMASY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT
SYSTEM: A NATURAL EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR 164-93 (2009);
Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy and
the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 87,
110-24 (2008). However, a National Security Court could institutionalize shortcuts
around due process, while military commissions and detention under the laws of war
have the virtue of being temporary measures that would more readily fade into disuse if
the need diminishes. For a useful debate, see Amos N. Guiora & John T. Parry, De
bate, Light at the End of the Pipeline?: Choosing a Forum for Suspected Terrorists, 156
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 356 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/
terrorcourts.pdf.
100. Obama Remarks, supra note 10. For a dissenting view, see Gude, supra note
62, at 4 (arguing that military commissions provided insufficient procedural safeguards,
compared with courts martial).
101. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 n.9 (1942). See generally Obama Re
marks, supra note 10 (discussing history of military commissions).
102. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex Parte Milligan: Military Trials, En
emy Combatants, and Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES
93, 94-96 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
103. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48 (upholding use of military commission to try Ger
man saboteurs).
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troduction of evidence and the choice of charges against
defendants.
Under the Constitution’s Define and Punish Clause,104 Con
gress has some leeway in designating crimes punishable by military
commission.105 Military commissions probably have jurisdiction
over crimes such as conspiracy.106 Military commissions have often
tried defendants based on conspiracy charges, and international law
provides that defendants accused of crimes akin to conspiracy, such
as participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise, may be tried in anal
ogous settings.107 Any other result would allow terrorists to game
the system and encourage false negatives.
However, reviewing courts must limit this flexibility to ensure
that false positives do not proliferate. Certain allegations, such as
the provision of material support to the organization, may not fit
within the rubric of the law of war absent a showing of specific in
tent to aid in hostilities against the United States or its allies.108 A
military commission would lack jurisdiction to hear such cases. A
commission would also lack jurisdiction over charges involving con
duct that was not criminal at the time the conduct occurred.109
Military commissions should also limit the evidence they can
admit. A military commission should not admit evidence obtained
by coercion. As Anglo-American courts have held for over two
hundred years, evidence obtained in this manner is unreliable.110
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress power “[t]o define and pun
ish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations”).
105. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 323, 335 (2001) (suggesting that courts will likely accord substantial deference
to Congress’s determinations regarding offenses against international law).
106. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 598-601 (2006) (plurality opinion) (as
serting that the law of war did not encompass conspiracy). Moreover, Hamdan con
cerned a unilateral executive order, not a statute enacted by Congress pursuant to its
authority under the Define and Punish Clause. Id. at 601.
107. Id. at 611 n.40; cf. Mark A. Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecuting
and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, the Geneva Conventions, and International Criminal
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (2007) (arguing that conspiracy prosecutions
may serve expressive goals under the law of war).
108. One bill currently under consideration in Congress designates material sup
port of the organization as a war crime, along with material support of hostilities. See
H.R. REP. NO. 111-288, § 1802, at 423 (2009) (Conf. Rep.). The broader definition is
problematic under the law of war, even given Congress’s leeway under the Define and
Punish Clause.
109. See Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo Courts,
103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 172, 180 (2008). Whether prohibitions in civilian crimi
nal law or the common law of war would provide adequate notice to a defendant
charged before a military commission is a matter beyond the scope of this Article.
110. See R. v. Warickshall, (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-36 (K.B.).
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Admitting such evidence would raise the risk of false positives to
intolerable levels as well as encourage deterioration in the institu
tional culture and controls that have long been the pride of the
American military.
C. Detention Under the Law of War
Detention of civilians who have assisted combatants is permis
sible under the law of war. However, here too, limits are necessary
to avoid providing a “blank check” to the government.111 Fortu
nately, courts have already done useful work in striking this
balance.112
To avert false negatives, the administration should adopt the
reasoning in Hamlily v. Obama.113 The Hamlily court found that
the law of war, including the Geneva Convention, supported deten
tion of putative civilians who were “part of” Al-Qaeda or the
Taliban.114 The court rightly found authority for such detention in
Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),
passed shortly after September 11.115 International law also has im
plied that a government involved in a conflict with a terrorist group
can detain putative civilians who function as part of the group’s in
frastructure, either giving or receiving commands and undertaking
obligations to the group in excess of duties undertaken by an ordi
nary civilian worker in a conventional state.116 An individual who
111. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). See generally Matthew C.
Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Ter
rorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008) (offering criteria and procedures for
detention).
112. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 78 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that
the President may detain persons who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks . . . and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks”).
113. Id. at 70-76.
114. Id. at 75; cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authori
zation and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2109-15 (2005) (discussing
interaction of law of war and Congress’s post-September 11 Authorization for the Use
of Military Force); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103
AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 53-55 (2009) (discussing authority under law of war for detention of
civilians indirectly assisting combatant groups).
115. See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (noting that “[t]he AUMF authorizes the
President to ‘use all necessary and appropriate force against those . . . organizations . . .
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided’ the September 11 attacks”
(quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224, 224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)))).
116. See id. at 73-75 (citing, inter alia, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Interna
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Part IV, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609).
Protocol II protects “civilians” from targeting by a government engaged in a conflict
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knowingly transports weapons for Al-Qaeda, for example, can be
detained.117 However, the provision of such material support is
merely evidence that the individual is part of Al-Qaeda, not an in
dependent substantive basis for detention.118
While these distinctions can be difficult, determining the ad
missibility of evidence is even more complex. Courts should re
quire that the government establish the accuracy and reliability of
its evidentiary submissions instead of receiving a presumption of
accuracy.119 The court should consider consistency with other evi
dence, circumstances surrounding the obtaining of such evidence,
and accuracy of translation. Accusations by a witness previously
judged unreliable may be discounted if also based on hearsay, such
as conversations by others about the detainee.120 Here, as else
where, informants, including jail snitches, should be regarded with
some skepticism.121 These witnesses often have something to sell
and an agenda of their own to vindicate, including striking a better
deal for themselves. This prospect, like the prospect of ending a
coercive interrogation, may lead the subject to say what his captors
wish to hear.
However, courts also need to appreciate that detention under
the laws of war has historically been a matter of status and broad
indicia of conduct. For example, to detain an individual as a pris
oner of war, a government needs to show that the detainee has pre
pared for or participated in hostilities. Once the government
establishes this, detention is authorized.122 The government does
not need to show that a soldier of an enemy power has fired his
rifle—capture of the individual in a uniform of an enemy power
would be sufficient. It should be sufficient for the government to
with a terrorist or rebel group. As the Hamlily court indicated, such protection would
be unnecessary if international humanitarian law classified all members of terrorist or
armed rebel groups as civilians. See id. at 73-74.
117. Id. at 75.
118. Id. at 75-77.
119. See Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 614 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2009).
120. Id. at 57.
121. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69 (1995) (dis
cussing cooperation and the lawyer’s professional responsibility as an officer of the
court); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 926-31 (1999) (outlining systemic
factors that encourage dishonesty among cooperators).
122. See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 74. “The laws of war traditionally emphasize
pure associational status as the primary ground for detention; individual conduct pro
vides only a secondary, alternative predicate.” Id. (quoting Chesney & Goldsmith,
supra note 99, at 1084) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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show that an individual has participated in training at a terrorist
camp. Probative evidence of membership should include the de
tainee’s lack of a passport, which often dovetails with Al-Qaeda op
eratives’ tactics to conceal time spent in Afghanistan or Pakistan.123
Further concrete or specific evidence should not be necessary for
detention under the laws of war; to require such evidence confuses
the evidentiary showing in this context with the more particularized
context appropriate to criminal trials, where the environment typi
cally permits more methodical investigation by law-enforcement
authorities. Military apprehension involves a conflict between mili
tary goals and law-enforcement goals; courts should not impose
pressure on the military to neglect the former in favor of the
latter.124
D. Accuracy and Exit: The Question of Bagram
Accuracy at Guantanamo means little if the government can
detain individuals elsewhere based on flimsy evidence. This would
allow the government to treat closing Guantanamo as a shell game
and enjoy public-relations benefits while maintaining the system
that the Bush administration initiated.125 Accuracy must meet a
more robust test.
123. The provision of support should be probative evidence of membership when
the support is closely related in time, geography, or operational planning to acts of
violence.
124. The exigencies of the battlefield should also inform the reach of criminal
procedure. Courts should not require that military personnel capturing suspected ter
rorists provide Miranda warnings. Cf. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1040, 123 Stat. 2190, 2454 (2009) (barring military
personnel from providing Miranda warnings to captives suspected of terrorist activity).
Nevertheless, personnel who interrogate a detainee in the course of a criminal investi
gation may find it prudent to provide Miranda warnings in some form.
A number of commentators have warned that detention regimes undermine the
broader view of efficiency espoused by the new administration by risking ongoing alien
ation of important global audiences. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 60; Deborah
Pearlstein, We’re All Experts Now: A Security Case Against Security Detention, 40 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 577 (2009); cf. Gude, supra note 62, at 13 (arguing that detention
authority should be limited to individuals captured at or near the battlefield). On bal
ance, the authorization for detention under law-of-war doctrine and the need to prevent
further catastrophic attacks outweigh this concern, assuming that such a regime includes
procedures to minimize the risk of false positives. Cf. David Cole, supra note 68, at
747-50 (arguing for a more circumscribed criteria for detention).
125. The government may also resort to the targeted killing of terrorist opera
tives. See William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination:
The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 679-82 (2003) (discussing interna
tional and domestic norms governing targeted killing).

R
R

R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE203.txt

366

unknown

Seq: 28

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

24-MAY-10

13:38

[Vol. 32:339

Fortunately, at least one district court has found this way. In
Maqaleh v. Gates, the district court held that habeas corpus ex
tended to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, where the United
States has housed hundreds of detainees, including those brought in
from other areas.126 The court ruled that detainees apprehended
outside Afghanistan and rendered there by United States forces
were on the same footing as Guantanamo detainees.127 The Su
preme Court had cautioned in Boumediene v. Bush that creating
habeas-free zones abroad would allow the executive to “contract[ ]
away” the accountability the Framers built into the separation of
powers.128 The Obama administration has recently sought to im
prove procedures at Bagram,129 but it is unclear whether these steps
will make a material difference without the accountability that
habeas yields.
V. SITING APPROACHES
The principles articulated by President Obama in his May 2009
address offer a foundation for considering the logistical question of
how to close Guantanamo. With proper judicial review, the threetiered approach of civilian trials, military trials, and detention under
the laws of war can address problems of accuracy. A variety of ap
proaches are possible to ensure equity and efficiency, as well.
A. Dispersion Rules
One common approach to siting difficulties is the use of disper
sion rules. These rules promote equity and burden-sharing by
guarding against overconcentration of facilities. For example, New
York’s law for siting group homes for people with mental disabili
ties requires a finding that a particular site does not currently have
an overconcentration of such uses.130 The process set up to receive
arguments about overconcentration and other issues also has the
same benefit as any other process—it channels discussion into a
neutral process where people feel that they have been heard. Just
126. Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 235 (D.D.C. 2009).
127. Id. at 220.
128. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008) (“The test for deter
mining the scope of [the habeas corpus guarantee in the Suspension Clause] must not
be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain.”).
129. See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Will Expand Detainee Review in Afghan Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at A1.
130. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(C) (McKinney 2006); cf. Margu
lies, supra note 1, at 976-84.
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as democracy promotes legitimacy and acceptance by allowing peo
ple a voice, a process for siting accomplishes this result. To pro
mote flexibility, Congress could also provide for waiving the
dispersion rules in appropriate cases where host communities fash
ioned workable arrangements with the federal government.
B. Siting Commission
Dispersion rules could also be folded into an even more com
prehensive process involving a siting commission. Previous admin
istrations used a commission with some success to address the
difficult issue of closing military bases.131 A commission can apply
neutral criteria, including overconcentration. It can also look at the
degree of danger a community might fear because of escapes and
terrorist reprisals.132 Finally, it can consider the steps required to
minimize these safety issues. While the base closure model con
cerned closing sites, not opening them, the issues of equity and the
public good were largely the same. Each community benefits from
a base, which provides employment and a flow of federal dollars,
while the public as a whole might benefit from closing some of the
bases to avoid redundancy. A similar model might work in the de
tainee siting context. A commission also provides some political
cover for legislators—they can point to the process in the same way
that elected officials can avoid commenting on criminal trials by
noting that the process is going forward. Legislators are also free to
weigh in as part of the process and then can assert credibly that
they made their cases and the commission decided based on neutral
criteria.
C. Site Auctions
A more controversial approach might be to establish an auc
tion for detainee sites. Under an auction approach, a community or
state could bid to establish a site for a given number of detainees.
Communities that bid earlier and for higher numbers would receive
131. See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, About the Com
mission, http://www.brac.gov/about.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2010); see also Ryan San
ticola, Encroachment: Where National Security, Land Use, and the Environment Collide,
10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 329, 348 n.117 (2005). One commentator has urged a
“blue-ribbon panel” that would serve a similar function for transferring detainees to the
United States. See Mendelson, supra note 60.
132. For a useful discussion of fears in the context of siting nuclear waste disposal
facilities, see Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting
Majorities, and the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31, 64-66 (2008).
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benefits from the federal government, including a priority for pub
lic-works projects and other federal spending. A cap could limit the
number of detainees in any one community, thereby promoting eq
uity goals. Of course, if NIMBY pressures are strong, finding com
munities to volunteer may be challenging. An additional incentive
to elicit bids might be setting a time deadline, after which all com
munities would go into the “hopper” for consideration by a com
mission, or perhaps for random assignment.
D. Security Impact Statements
Another alternative that Congress appears to have embraced
as of October 2009 involves security impact statements for each
projected transfer.133 The security-impact-statement approach re
quires that the President provide Congress with an analysis of the
security consequences of each transfer of a Guantanamo detainee
to a mainland United States facility.134 The President must con
sider security issues caused by the transfer. Furthermore, the Presi
dent must consult with the governor of each state where a transfer
is contemplated, in order to optimize planning. The security impact
statement process, like similar processes in environmental law, en
courages government to think methodically about consequences. It
also allows legislators and others to point to the process as an indi
cation that they understand constituents’ concerns. While some
questions may emerge about the constitutionality of the impact
statement and consultation provisions, the President will most
likely decide that the prudent course is to comply with the legisla
tion. Any other course could result in a continuation of the con
gressional restiveness that hampered placement efforts for the early
months of the Obama presidency.
E. Offshore Siting: Guantanamo Redux?
For certain environmentally beneficial uses, such as wind farms
and liquid natural gas facilities, planners are looking at alternatives
such as offshore siting.135 Offshore siting avoids a disparate impact
on any one community and diffuses the NIMBY syndrome.136
133. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-84, § 1041, 123 Stat. 2190, 2454 (2009).
134. Id.
135. See Kathryn E. Kransdorf, Note, Not on My Coastline: The Jurisdictional
Battle over the Siting of LNG Import Terminals, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 81
(2005).
136. See Mendelson, supra note 60.
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Guantanamo itself is an offshore facility. One solution to the
NIMBY issues hindering Guantanamo’s closure is keeping Guanta
namo open. The problem with this alternative is that it represents
the status quo—Guantanamo is a public relations and human rights
problem precisely because it is offshore. This outcome would not
be a change of the kind that President Obama promised. The re
joinder is that Guantanamo is a problem not because of its geo
graphic location, per se, but because of the legal regime that the
former administration implemented by virtue of that location. The
courts’ imposition of the rule of law on Guantanamo has eased this
asymmetry in legal regimes. A detainee camp located at Guanta
namo could have even more procedural protections for detainees as
well as a more user-friendly environment for the development of
appropriate lawyer-client relationships.137 On this view, Guanta
namo is merely a state of mind, subject to change as legal rules
promote uniformity and transparency. Through incentives and
compensation for states and foreign nations, the government could
draw down the Guantanamo census to a core of perhaps fifty to
sixty detainees whom the government cannot release because of
fears that they will recidivate. While the placement of these detain
ees at Guantanamo is not optimal from a symbolic standpoint, it at
least avoids problems with accuracy that would result from releas
ing dangerous detainees and the NIMBY problems linked with
transfer to the United States.
F. Incentives and Log-Rolling in International Resettlement
For resettlement internationally, incentives may work better
than equity-related dispersion rules. The use of foreign aid to help
further the national and broader global interest is nothing new.
The United States used this strategy to help contain the spread of
Communism in the second half of the last century.138 Using similar

137. The government imposed significant obstacles to these relationships. See
Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1268422;
Mark Denbeaux & Christina Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney-Client Relationship in Guan
tanamo Bay, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 491 (2007); Margulies, supra note 19, at 365.
138. Cf. William P. Alford, Exporting “The Pursuit of Happiness,” 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1677, 1693 (2000) (book review) (discussing role of foreign aid in furthering
democracy).
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methods to help close Guantanamo will further the cause of global
counterterrorism today.139
VI.

A BLENDED APPROACH

An effective approach needs to consider both the content of
measures related to the closure of Guantanamo and the sequencing
of such measures. The administration has moved to put procedures
in place to promote accuracy, which courts should accept with the
changes mentioned in the previous part on jurisdiction of military
commissions, scrutiny of hearsay, and access to habeas at Bagram.
As President Obama indicated in his May 2009 address, civilian
criminal prosecutions should be the preferred mode in order to take
advantage of the additional flexibility signaled by the courts in cases
like Odeh.
On the equity front, the administration should immediately ask
Congress to establish a bipartisan commission to examine issues re
garding the resettlement of detainees. If the commission recom
mends dispersion rules and a waiver system, the administration
should support this option. Similarly, the commission should rec
ommend legislation permitting transfer to a secure United States
facility of detainees held under the law of war along with a bar on
release to any United States community of any such detainee.140
Legislation authorizing transfer of detainees to United States facili
ties should authorize only the transfer of detainees who have been
determined by a final order of the federal courts to be members of
Al-Qaeda.141 Finally, for other nations, the administration should
provide incentives to encourage resettlement while ensuring that
receiving countries have adequate security to handle recidivism.
CONCLUSION
The challenge of closing Guantanamo entails consideration of
three perennial values in siting debates: efficiency, equity, and accu
139. As one key example, the administration must commit itself to strengthening
the capacity of the Yemeni government to arrest, detain, try, and punish terrorists. See
Josh Meyer, Yemen Forms New Front in Terror Fight, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at A1.
140. The courts would likely honor this bar. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
695-96 (2001) (suggesting that terrorism or other cases that would “leave [an] ‘unpro
tected spot in the Nation’s armor’” constitute an exception to the general rule that
government cannot detain aliens if it has no reasonable prospect of deporting them to
another country (quoting Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 602 (1953))).
141. Some detainees have declined to seek habeas relief. In such cases, the Secre
tary of Defense should certify prior to a transfer to custody within the United States
that release would endanger national security.
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racy. President Obama’s one-year deadline for closing Guanta
namo reframed efficiency in a salutary manner, considering
Guantanamo’s role as a symbol that suppressed international coop
eration with counterterrorism policies. However, the President and
his advisors did not anticipate the signal the closure pledge sent to
Congress. Congress interpreted the closure pledge as heralding a
reduced commitment to accuracy in ferreting out false negatives. It
also viewed the pledge as privileging conceptions of international
equity over concern about states taking more than their fair share
of detainee transfers.
Hindsight suggests that the new administration should have de
veloped a comprehensive plan first and arrived at a deadline for
closing Guantanamo as it implemented the plan. President
Obama’s May 2009 address realigned the administration’s signals
with Congress’s expectations while also signaling the President’s
commitment to the rule of law. More needs to be done to control
the jurisdiction of military commissions, assure the reliability of
hearsay evidence, and provide habeas to detainees at other sites
such as Bagram. Any delays in the closure of Guantanamo are a
small price to pay for ensuring the appropriate balance of effi
ciency, equity, and accuracy in detention policy.

